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Abstract
 The Japanese central government and its local authorities undertook public 
works as a response to rising unemployment like most European countries including 
Britain between the wars. The approach was in line with the recommendation of the 
International Labour Conference in 1919 which stated that ‘the Conference recommends 
that each Member of the International Labour Organisation co-ordinate the execution of 
all work undertaken under public authority with a view to reserving such work as far 
as practicable for periods of unemployment’. British unemployment relief works which 
began in December 1920 under the management of Unemployment Grants Committee 
(UGC) subsidized the annual charge on unemployment relief works undertaken by 
local authorities out of capital expenditure and paid part of the wages bill for approved 
schemes of ‘useful’ work. But as the compulsory unemployment insurance system was 
the principal response in interwar Britain, the role of the unemployment relief works 
remained very limited. Japanese unemployment relief works which had begun at local 
and central level as an administrative response to social unrest gradually developed into 
a welfare policy for the unemployed but one which remained central to the Japanese 
government’s response in the absence of any compulsory unemployment insurance 
scheme. In this paper, we try to clarify what was unique to Japan’s unemployment relief 
works policy and what was common with the unemployment relief works between 
Britain and Japan in the interwar years.
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1  Introduction
 It is common with most European countries including Britain between the wars that 
the central governments and its local authorities undertook public works as a response 
to rising unemployment and a lot of researchers paid attention on the topics relating to 
unemployment public works. The approach was in line with the recommendation of the 
70
Annual Research Bulletin of Osaka Sangyo University
International Labour Conference in 1919 which stated that ‘the Conference recommends 
that each Member of the International Labour Organisation co-ordinate the execution of 
all work undertaken under public authority with a view to reserving such work as far as 
practicable for periods of unemployment…’＊1 According to a retrospective International 
Labour Oﬃce (ILO) report published in 1935, this recommendation had lead to a variety 
of responses throughout Europe.
 In France, for example, local authorities and government departments undertook town 
planning projects, the construction and improvement of railways, roads, and ports, canal 
works, building schools, as well as rural development in an eﬀort to ease unemployment.＊2 
In Germany road making, waterways construction and improvement, the development of gas 
and electricity supply, house-building, agricultural settlement and land improvement were 
developed for the same purpose.＊3 In Britain, under the Unemployment Grants Committee 
established in 1920, sewerage schemes, water supply improvements, the extension of docks 
and harbours, electricity supply, and the widening and reconstruction of unclassiﬁed roads 
were subsequently carried out as a response to increased registered unemployment.＊4
 In Japan, relief works for the benefit of the unemployed were established for the 
first time in 1925 and were carried through under various institutional formats until 
1942. Though such public works were generally regarded (Britain is an example) as 
a temporary and additional form of relief alongside that afforded by the compulsory 
unemployment insurance scheme, they remained the principal response in Japan to 
emerging unemployment as the authorities set their face against any form financial 
commitment to the out-of-work, even on a tripartite basis. 
 The need for such policies was first raised officially during World War I. In June 
1918 the government established the Enquiry Committee on Relief Works (Kyusai Jigyo 
Chosakai) as one response to the growing fear that social unrest could emerge in the 
aftermath of the war. ＊5 During wartime the Japanese economy had expanded rapidly 
through increased exports accompanied by rapid inﬂation. Total Japanese exports, which 
 
＊1  International Labour Oﬃce, Unemployment and Public Works, Studies and Reports, Series 
C, No.15, 1931, p.186.




＊5  Rodosho, Rodo Gyoseishi, Vol. 1., Tokyo, 1961, pp.9-10. [Ministry of Labour, The History of 
Labour Administration, Vol.1., Tokyo, 1961, pp.9-10.]
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in 1914 amounted to 670.8 million yen per year, had increased to 792.6 million yen by 
1915, 1,233.9 million yen in 1916, 1,752 million yen in 1917, reaching 2,159 million yen in 
1918. The consumers’ price index (1935=100) stood at 62.0 in 1914 rising slightly to 62.7 
in 1916 but then increasing to 76.9 in 1917 and to 103.5 in 1918. ＊6
 Although the rise in export values and prices beneﬁted some sections of society, it 
was the fall in the living standards of the majority because of the rapid increase in the 
price of basic commodities that remained the principal feature of the period. This was 
most graphically demonstrated in the national Rice Riots (Kome Sodo) during August 
1918. Following the Russian Revolution, Japan had sent military forces to Siberia. 
Merchants, anticipating a significant increase in demand for rice, raised rice prices 
considerably. This had an immediate impact upon the local population and anger spread 
rapidly. The price of rice had already risen by 52.6% between June 1916 and June 1917＊7 
while the index of real wages (1914=100) dropped to 98.4 in 1916 and further to 92.3% in 
1917. The riots a year later forced the resignation of the cabinet and this, together with 
the expectation of rising unemployment following the war, prompted the government to 
prepare plans to placate the Japanese population in peace time. 
 In addition to the Enquiry Committee on Relief Works the Minister of the Home 
Office launched a further investigation in December 1918 into which policies might 
be most suitable for the protection of the unemployed in peace time. The report of 
the Committee, published on 2 March 1919, recommended an immediate Home Oﬃce 
survey of labour market conditions, measures to encourage the private sector to resist 
discharging workers in any economic downturn, together with the establishment of 
Employment Exchanges in the principal cities. Central government, it urged further, 
should promote migration, subsidise the transportation of the unemployed, and promote 
public works, all against the background of a low interest rate policy. ＊8 Contemporary 
observers feared that the government would merely opt for migration as a solution 
to rising unemployment since many of those who became unemployed were believed 
to come originally from the agricultural areas. An immediate solution to the emerging 
unemployment problem could be found in promoting a return to the land. 
 The government paid more attention than was anticipated to the plea that local 
 
＊6  Ando,Y., eds., Kindai Nihon Keizaishi Yoran, Dai 2 Han, Tokyo, 1979, p.4. [Ando, Y.,eds., 
The Handbook of Modern Japanese Economic History, 2nd Edition, Tokyo, 1979, p.4.]
＊7  Hashimoto, J., Daikyokoki no Nihon Shihonshugi, Tokyo, 1984, pp.60-61.[Hashimoto, J., Japa-
nese Capitalism under the Great Depression, Tokyo, 1984, pp.60-61.]
＊8  Rodosho, op.cit., pp.168-170. [Ministry of Labour, op.cit., pp. 168-170.]
72
Annual Research Bulletin of Osaka Sangyo University
authorities should promote works such as road and rail development and improvements 
to rivers, all to be subsidized by government funds at low interest. ＊9
 The downturn in economic activity in 1920 had spurred action. The Home Office 
immediately urged local authorities to act on a broad front:  to encourage industrialists 
to do what they could to prevent dismissing workers, to provide free accommodation 
and free medical services for the unemployed, to encourage the unemployed in the cities 
to return to their home agricultural areas, and to consider what works on roads and 
rivers might be undertaken to provide immediate relief to those thrown out of work. ＊10 
Although this suggested a bold plan of action, neither the government nor the authorities 
did much in the immediate term. The only action the government took was to introduce 
the Employment Exchanges Act in 1921, excusing its inactivity on other fronts on the 
grounds of the state of the budget and the need to pursue a cautious ﬁnancial policy. 
 What changed matters was the Great Kanto Earthquake. The disruption to economic 
activity as a consequence of this disaster had an immediate impact on the labour 
market. Unemployment resulting from the earthquake was put at 96,103 in Tokyo and 
29,143 in Yokohama. Although these ﬁgures cannot be compared directly with the levels 
of unemployment resulting from economic downturn in industrialized countries of the 
West, they none the less prompted the Japanese government to draft the unemployed 
in the aﬀected areas into remedial construction work. Workers in the damaged areas 
who were engaged in production work for the government were moved to regional 
government factories without being fired and loans were provided for unemployed 
workers on their families who wished to move to other regional areas. ＊11
 The effect of the government response, however, should not be exaggerated. 
Although the central authorities acted promptly to promote construction in the most 
damaged areas, bringing forward public works which ministries had planned for the 
 
＊9  Kyusai Jigyo Chosakai, Shitsugyosha Hogo Shisetsu, cited in Ibid., pp.169-170. [Relief Works 
Committee, Policies for the Protection of the Unemployed, cited in Ibid., pp.169-170.]
＊10  Naimu Jikan yori Chiho Chokan Ate, ‘Shitsugyo Hogo ni Kansuru Ken Imei Tsucho’, 21 
April, 1920, cited in Ibid., pp.170-171. From the Vice Minister of Home Oﬃce to the Local 
Governors,‘On Public Policies for the Protection of Unemployment’, 21 April, 1920, cited 
in Ibid., pp.170-171.]
＊11  ‘Kanto Daishinsai niyoru Shitsugyo Taisaku no Hoshin’, 21 September, 1923, Jikan Kaigi 
Kettei, cited in Ibid., pp.566-567. [‘The Principles of the Unemployment Policy caused by 
the Great Kanto Earthquake’, 21 September, 1923, at the conference of the Vice Ministers, 
cited in Ibid., pp.566-567.]
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future and dedicating them especially for the unemployed, the Social Bureau of the 
Home Oﬃce actually spent more eﬀort in encouraging the movement of the unemployed 
from the damaged areas to other regions. Most of the 9,103,000 yen raised by the 
government for the temporary recovery policies in the earthquake zone was used to 
establish new Employment Exchanges in Tokyo (20 extra branches) and in Yokohama (5 
new branches). The central authorities had urged public works activity but only in terms 
of what was thought to be necessary to meet immediate need. Although, therefore, there 
was support for unemployment relief works as a remedial response to unemployment in 
the period from the end of the World War I to the Great Kanto Earthquake this policy 
only became proactive in the emergency conditions.
 Although the ILO Reports mentioned above paid attention to Japan’s unemployment 
relief works in the international context, few researches are available on them. This 
paper ﬁrstly tries to review the representative researches on Japanese unemployment 
relief works. One of the most inﬂuential works on these topics has done by T. Nakamura, 
who evaluated the economic effects of Japanese unemployment related public works 
highly and wrote:
 Takahashi’s economic policies were undeniably successful. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to 
say that they were a grand experiment anticipating Keynesian economics. At the time the gold 
embargo was lifted in 1929, Takahashi published an essay in which he anticipated the theory 
of investment’s multiplier effect, and he was one who believed that the first imperative in 
seeking to balance the international payments must be in developing industry so as to expand 
exports. While Takahashi’s economic policies have frequently been criticised as irresponsible and 
inﬂationary, they were very eﬀective in revitalising the economy and reviving it from the post-
depression contraction. ＊12
 K. Kase who wrote a comprehensive book on interwar Japanese unemployment 
relief works, criticized Nakamura’s view that Nakamura’s evaluation on the economic 
eﬀect of unemployment related relief works was based on the planned budget ﬁgures 
and therefore over-estimation. ＊13 Kase himself suggested that the economic effect of 
 
＊12  Nakamura,T., ‘The Japanese Economy in the Interwar Period : a Brief Summary’, in 
Dore,R., and Sinha,R.,eds. With assistance from Sako,M., Japan and world depression : then 
and now : essays in memory of E.F. Penrose, Macmillan, 1987,p.64.
＊13  Kase,K., Senzen Nihon no Shitsugo Taisaku - Kyusaigata Kokyojigyo no Ichi Kenkyu - , 
Tokyo, 1998. [Kase, K., Unemployment Policy in Pre-war Japan - A Study of Relief Type 
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Japanese unemployment related relief works was much smaller.
 Kase’s study was very detailed and comprehensive on Japan’s unemployment relief 
works themselves, but the perspective of his study was very limited only to Japanese 
case and therefore it seems that he did not succeed enough to clarify the unique points 
of Japanese unemployment relief works. We believe that the Japanese cases should be 
considered in the international context. Nakamura’s study on the other hands, oﬀers the 
possibility of comparative study by using macro-economic methods but as Kase already 
pointed out, his evaluation of unemployment related public works need to be re-assessed.
 Japan and Britain basically followed the ILO’s recommendation and introduced the 
unemployment relief works, therefore, both countries’policy looks alike in several points. 
But economic structure of both countries was very diﬀerent as following table shows. 
　　　　　Table 1  Structure of Employment by Country in 1920 　　　　(%)
Country/Industry Japan US Britain Germany France
Primary Industry 55 27 7 30 29
Secondary Industry 22 34 50 42 36
Tertiary Industry 23 39 43 28 35
Miwa,R., Gaisetsu Nihon Kezaishi, Tokyo, 1993, p.98. 
[Miwa,R., The Outline of Japanese Economic History, Tokyo, 1993, p.98.]
 Japan, though it was said that it became one of the 5 leading countries in the world 
and considered as a developed country after the World War I, but over half of its labour 
force was still employed in the primary sector while in Britain only 7% of labour force 
was in the primary sector. This difference must have influenced on both countries’ 
unemployment policies including unemployment relief works. ＊14
 Taking count this fact in mind, in this paper, we they try to compare Japanese cases 
with the other countries ones and through it we aim to clarify what was common with 
unemployment relief works internationally and what was the unique character of the 
Japanese unemployment relief works. 
 In Britain, W.R. Garside published the comprehensive and influential book on 
Public Works -, Tokyo, 1998. Kase also summarized the Japanese unemployment policy 
in English. See Kase,K., ‘Unemployment Policy in Prewar Japan : How Progressive Was 
Japanese Social Policy ? ’, Social Science Japan Journal, Vol.7, No.2, August 2004.
＊14  About comprehensive interwar Japanese unemployment policy, see Kato,M.,‘Unemploy-
ment and Public Policy in Interwar Japan’, PhD thesis, University of Birmingham, 2002.
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British unemployment＊15 and he successfully drew the fate of the government’s policy 
against unemployment. In this paper, we try to clarify the character of the Japanese 
unemployment relief works and compare them with British ones because Britain had the 
most comprehensive unemployment policies in the world at that time. By doing so, we 
hope to draw what was unique to Japanese unemployment relief works and at the same 
time, what was common with unemployment relief works between Britain and Japan in 
the international context.
2  Unemployment Relief Works in Interwar Japan
(1) The emergence of unemployment relief works policy down to 1929
 It was not until 1925 that the government planned to promote unemployment relief 
works as part of official budgetary expenditure. Kase has identified four principal 
developments. In this section, we follow his four developments of unemployment relief 
works and try to add several background information and explanation as the bases for 
the international comparison.
 During these years between 1925 and 1928 unemployment relief works were 
confined to the severe winter months and limited to the six largest cities of Tokyo, 
Osaka, Kyoto, Yokohama, Nagoya, and Kobe. Real expenditure for such works amounted 
to around 3 million yen per year, with activity taping off during the last year. From 
1929 to 1931, Unemployment relief work was no longer limited to specific times of 
the year but undertaken when the government felt it necessary. During this period of 
greatest economic downturn the proportion of an expenditure on unemployment relief 
works compared to the outlay on public works as a whole increased to around 20% in 
1931. Between 1932 and 1934 following the abandonment of the gold standard deficit 
budgeting opened up the possibility of issuing loans for relief work expenditure in larger 
amounts. As a consequence total expenditure for relief works speciﬁcally designed for 
the unemployed as a proportion of total public works expenditure rose to around 30-40%. 
After 1935, with the gradual decrease of unemployment and emergence of shortages 
of labour, especially after the emergence of conﬂict between Japan and China, both the 
number and expenditure on relief works for the unemployed declined signiﬁcantly until 
 
＊15  Garside, W.R., British Unemployment 1919-1939 - A Study in Public Policy -,Cambridge 
University Press, 1990.
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1939. ＊16
 By the mid 1920s the government’s basic response of relying upon Employment 
Exchanges to place the out-of-work in jobs was considered an insuﬃcient response to 
the cyclical depression which had deepened by 1925. In August that year Wakatsuki, 
Minister at the Home Office, and Hamaguchi, Minister of Finance, together agreed 
that authorities in local areas where unemployment had increased noticeably should 
be encouraged to promote public works. The works were to be subsidized by the 
government to the extent of 50% of the total expenditure on wages. Other local 
authorities’ public works in Japan were not specifically designed for the relief of 
unemployment but which might be considered to be useful to relieve the economic 
situation were to be subsidized by central government to the same extent. The limit of 
such central government subsidy was set at 1,300,000 yen. ＊17 
 The signiﬁcance of these discussions lay in the fact that previous recommendations, 
such as those by the Relief Works Committee had focussed on relief works as a way 
of allying any further deterioration in unemployment. By 1925 the provision of public 
works was being seen as a necessary and direct form of relief to the unemployed. As a 
Minister of the Home Oﬃce explained in August 1925:
 We are conscious of the conditions of the unemployed caused by economic depression. Data 
of the activities of the Employment Exchanges over several months indicate that unemployment 
rates are higher than usual and the lives of the unemployed have become seriously impaired, at 
least because of the present price of rice. We are now about to face a winter period, a time of 
severe cyclical unemployment. That is what we fear most. The government is therefore trying 
hard to establish appropriate policies against unemployment during the winter periods. However, 
simply giving money or alms to the unemployed has a tendency to promote idleness and this 
should be avoided. We think this proper therefore that jobs should be given to people who are 
ﬁnding it diﬃcult to live their lives. 
 On these grounds the central government should lift its ban on local authorities raising loans 
for the immediate purpose for providing relief works for the unemployed. The burden of such 
expenses should not be met only by local governments. The aim of unemployment relief works, 
 
＊16  Kase, K., Senzen Nihon no Shitsugo Taisaku - Kyusaigata Kokyojigyo no Ichi Kenkyu - , 
Tokyo, 1998, pp. 14-16. [Kase, K., Unemployment Policy in Pre-war Japan - A Study of Re-
lief Type Public Works -, Tokyo, 1998, pp. 14-16.]
＊17 Rodosho, op.cit., pp.567-568. [Ministry of Labour, op.cit., pp. 567-568.]
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however, should not be to absorb all who claim to be unemployed at any one time but rather to 
relieve those who have genuine diﬃculty in maintaining a basic standard of living. In general the 
labour force needs to await the recovery of the economy in general through policies of austerity 
and industrial rationalization. What needed are discussions with the oﬃcials in the six largest 
cities where unemployment is concentrated in order to devolve appropriate responses. ＊18
 The Home Oﬃce’s statement reﬂected the contemporary resistance against ‘giving 
money or alms’ to the unemployed. This is essentially important characteristics of 
Japanese unemployment relief works programme. Despite trade union pressure the 
Japanese authorities resisted the idea of introducing a compulsory unemployment 
insurance system even though a Bill for this purpose had been submitted to Parliament 
as early as 1921. ＊19 It is also important to point out that the lack of the substantial relief 
works for the poor made the unemployment relief works something like the Poor Law 
relief. Any Japanese governments during the interwar years did not admit the ‘right’ 
to relief. These are the crucial diﬀerences between Japan and Britain.
 Officials were also anxious to focus their public works expenditure on particular 
groups of unemployed workers. Following the Kanto Earthquake it had become clear 
that many agricultural day labourers had migrated to the cities in order to increase their 
chances of obtaining a job at higher wages, given the wage differentials that existed 
between city day labourers (casual labourers) and agricultural day labourers. Although 
casual labourers wages tended to be lower than that of a carpenter, for example, 
they were considerably higher than agricultural day labourers and it was a growing 
temptation for the latter to migrate to the cities temporarily when economic conditions 
deteriorated in rural areas. The table below indicates the scale of the problem. It was 
the government’s intention, in other words, that if relief works were to be subsidized 
on behalf of the unemployed they should where possible be concentrated on the casual 
labourers in the principal cities.
 
＊18  Chuo Shokugyo Shokai Jimukyoku, Rodo Shokai Nenpo, 1925, p.39. [Central Employment 
Exchange Bureau, Annual Report of the Employment Exchanges, 1925, p.39.]
＊19  Kensei To, Shitsugyo Hoken Hoan, 1921, compiled in Rodosho, Shitsugyo Hoken 10 Nen 
Shi, Tokyo, 1960, pp.98-112. [Kensei-party, The Unemployment Insurance Bill, 1921, com-
piled in Ministry of Labour, The 10-Year History of Unemployment Insurance, Tokyo, 
1960, pp. 98-112.] 
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Table 2  Wage diﬀerentials for selected occupations in selected years  
(carpenter=100), 1910-1939.
Year Carpenter
Day Labourer Agricultural Day Labourer
Male Male Female
1910 100 66.3 48.8 30
1915 100 65.5 54.8 34.5
1920 100 76.7 55 35.1
1925 100 71.5 50.7 40.6
1930 100 65.5 45.8 34.5
1935 100 68.9 44 33.7
1939 100 73.5 68.7 55.6
Shirai and Shimada, ‘Japan ‘, in Dunlop, J.T., and Galenson, W., 
Labor in the Twentieth Century, New York and London, 1978, p. 306. 
 It is noteworthy, too, that by 1925 the government was prepared to consider 
subsidizing expenditure on unemployment relief works against the background of 
general budgetary retrenchment. The Japanese government had not yet committed 
itself to return to the gold standard even though it regarded such a move not as an 
issue of major dispute but rather one of judging the appropriate time. Until that time 
arrived the authorities faced budget deficits made worse by incidences such as the 
Great Earthquake in 1923. Concessions in favour of subsidizing employment relief works, 
therefore, had to be taken on very ﬁrm grounds.
 In an effort to find a positive way forward on unemployment relief works 
representatives of the Home Oﬃce met oﬃcials of ﬁve prefectures, Tokyo, Kanagawa, 
Kyoto, Aichi and Osaka in August 1925. The local authorities were urged to arrange 
labour-intensive unemployment relief works aimed at casual workers and to prepare a 
reasoned case for them, including planned dates of implementation and details of income 
and expenditure. Workers were to be employed through the Employment Exchanges 
at lower daily wages than ordinary workers in relevant areas. This reflected the 
government’s desire to prevent workers who already had jobs in agricultural areas from 
drifting into the cities for relative gain. Local authorities were to be encouraged in this 
activity by the provision of government loans notwithstanding the prevailing climate of 
ﬁnancial stringency. 
 This policy demonstrated the first move by the central government to subsidize 
unemployment relief works initiated by local authorities. It arose in part from 
recognition of the worsening economic conditions occasioned by the Great Earthquake 
of 1923. In addition, workers’ wages, especially those employed in casual occupations, 
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had suﬀered from the drop in the international exchange rate. Moreover, by 1925 they 
had been a noticeable rise in the number of oﬃcial protest meetings over unemployment 
policy. ＊20 
 The Head of the Employment Section of the Social Bureau of the Home Oﬃce, R. 
Ohno, recorded that although unrest had risen amongst skilled workers following the 
Washington Naval Treaty, which had prohibited Japan from constructing new warships 
for 10 years and which curtailed work on six warships under construction resulting in 
the dismissal of 7,500 navy oﬃcers and 14,000 workers＊21, it was unrest amongst casual 
workers by the mid-1920s that gave rise to most concern. ＊22 There was at the time no 
firm statistical basis upon which to determine unemployment among casual and non-
casual workers. The Home Oﬃce’s own survey had estimated unemployment amongst 
casual workers in the six largest cities of Japan at the beginning of 1926 at 29.3% and 
that it was only likely to fall in the immediate term to around 20%. ＊23 These surveys 
were conducted by the police, which meant that the unemployment problem was 
strongly connected to the social unrest.
 Oﬃcial policy from 1925 until 1928 concentrated on providing unemployment relief 
works in winter time with such works directed especially to those most in need. As such 
the activity reﬂected something of the attitude of Britain’s former Poor Law provisions 
where relief was afforded to those most in need on restricted terms. The prevailing 
principle of budgetary retrenchment meant that the authorities were reluctant to spend 
too much on such relief provision, although local authorities were encouraged to seek 
government loans when the need for them could be justiﬁed.
 In order to prevent unemployment relief works being used by workers from 
unrelated local areas, the Deputy Minister at the Home Oﬃce reminded governors in the 
prefectures of Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Aichi, Kanagawa, and Hyogo in October 1925 that :
 
＊20  Jigyo Chosetsu Iinkai, Taisho 14 Nendo yori Showa 3 Nendo ni Itaru Shitusyo 
Kyusai Jigyo Gaiyo, 1930, p.24. [The Committee for the Regulation of Public Works, 
Outline of Unemployment Relief Works from 1925 to 1928, 1930, p. 24.]
＊21  Tsuchiana, F., Shakai Seisaku Seidoshi Ron, Kyoto, 1990. [Tsuchiana, F., History of the In-
stitute for Social Policy, Kyoto, 1990, p.456.
＊22  Ohno no Kaiso, in ‘Senzen no Rodo Gyosei wo Kataru - Zadan Kai -’, Rodo Gyoseishi Dai 
1 Kan Yoroku, Tokyo, 1961, p.24. [Recollection by Ohno, R., in‘Memories of the Labour 
Administration in Prewar Japan’, the Record of the Symposium, compiled in Ministry of 
Labour, The History of Labour Administration, Supplement of  Vol. 1, Tokyo, 1961, p.22.]
＊23  Jigyo Chosetsu Iinkai, op.cit., pp.14-15 and p.19. [The Committee for Regulation of Public 
Works, op.cit., pp.14-15 and p.19.]  
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 It is important to confirm that the purpose of unemployment relief works is to relieve the 
unemployed who live in the six largest cities and who are most directly aﬀected by unemployment. 
Therefore we have to be careful that the unemployment relief works are not occupied by 
seasonal workers from unrelated regions. In order to do so it is proper to distinguish in advance 
those unemployed who live in the six largest cities who alone should have access to jobs on the 
unemployment relief  works in order that such works can proceed without any diﬃculties. ＊24
 
 What concerned the Minister in Japan was the number of seasonal workers, in the 
winter period especially, who concentrated in the cities seeking more remunerative 
employment then was available in rural areas. This resulted not only in an increase of 
the numbers unemployed but also deterioration in the lives of seasonal workers. ＊25 This 
derived from the lack of any substantial relief scheme for the poor in the rural areas. 
 With these strictures in mind unemployment relief works were oﬃcially introduced 
into Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Yokohama, Kobe and Nagoya in mid-November 1925 and in 
one prefecture Osaka. They were focused on the winter periods and continued until 
1928 under strict conditions. Government subsidies amounted to one-half of the total 
wage bill but the latter had to be no more than 20% of the total cost of any project. 
Moreover, the wages paid to any skilled labourers had to be no greater than 30% 
of the total wage bill. ＊26 The nature of the work included repair of roads, building 
motorways, the repair of embankments, and other reclamation work. The accumulated 
number employed on such works amounted to 964,813 in 1925, 689,287 in 1926, 771,583 in 
1927, and 611,723 in 1928. ＊27 
 
＊24  Chuo Shokugyo Shokai Jimukyoku,‘Shitsugyo Kyusai no Mokuteki wo Motte Shiko suru Ji-
gyo ni Kansuru Ken’,16 October 1925, Naimu Jikan yori Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Kanagawa, 
Aichi, Hyogo Fuken Chiji Ate, Chuo Shokugyo Shokai Jimukyoku, Shokugyo Shokai Geppo, 
October 1925,p.1.[‘On Works for the purpose of Unemployment Relief ’, 16 October 1925, 
from Vice Minister of Home Office to the Governors of  Prefectures of Tokyo, Osaka, 
Kyoto, Kanagawa, Aichi, Hyogo , Central Employment Exchange Bureau, Monthly Report 
of the Employment Exchanges, October, 1925, p.1.]
＊25  ‘Rodosha no Kisetsuteki Dekasegi ni Kansuru Ken’, 16 October 1925, Naimu Jikan yori 
Kaku Chiho Chokan Ate, Chuo Shokugyo Shokai Jimukyoku, Shokugyo Shokai Geppo, Oc-
tober 1925, p.1. [‘On Seasonal Workers’,16 October 1925, from Vice Minister of Home Of-
ﬁce to the Governors of the Prefectures, Central Employment Exchange Bureau, Monthly 
Report of the Employment Exchanges, October, 1925, p.1.]
＊26  Rodosho, op.cit., p.570. [Ministry of Labour, op.cit., p.570.]
＊27  Rodosho, op.cit., pp. 570-571. [Ministry of Labour, op.cit., pp.570-571.]
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(2) The changing characteristics of unemployment relief works from 1929
 Japan was seen to suffer less from the Great Depression from 1929 than most 
Western industrialized nations. None the less, the relative worsening of unemployment 
from Japan’s perspective only strengthened the urge within government to retain a 
balanced budget and in the private sector for it to seek forms of industrial rationalization, 
each in themselves destined to worsen the immediate prospects of the unemployed. 
What had become clearer was that unemployment was a problem no longer conﬁned 
to the principal cities in Japan. The Hamaguchi cabinet of Minsei-party which had 
won the General Election of 1929 immediately declared its intention to concentrate on 
remedial ‘social policies’. As earlier September 1929 separate inquiries were undertaken 
into the unemployment relief system, the regulations for the prevention and relief of 
unemployment, and the range of subsidies then being provided by the government for 
unemployment relief work. 
 The inquiries conﬁrmed that unemployment relief works in speciﬁed regions were 
still regarded as the most effective and appropriate response for the government to 
make. Local authorities continued to be encouraged to raise loans for such purposes and 
to concentrate their eﬀorts on persuading the private sector to engage in similar forms 
of repair and construction that could oﬀer work to both casual and skilled workers. In 
order to boost the unemployment relief works programme local authorities from 1929 
could be ordered by central government to undertake such activity. In the same year a 
Special Committee for the Regulation of Public Works was established with the Prime 
Minister as President. Representatives of the ministries concerned with unemployment 
were henceforth obliged to select appropriate public works and to arrange the period 
and place of their implementation. ＊28 
 For its part the government amended its budget regulations in April 1930 in order to 
facilitate its public works policy. Relief works were now to be initiated in areas where 
unemployment had only recently emerged as a noticeable problem. Thereafter cities, 
towns, and villages were able to apply for loans at low interest rate to undertake works 
for the improvement of water supply, land reclamation, and forestry activity. If such 
 
＊28  Shakai Seisaku Shingikai, Shakai Seisaku Shingikai Yoran, 1929, pp.20-29. Nishinarita,Y., 
and Mori,T., Shakai Seisaku Shingikai Shiryo Shu, Vol.1, Tokyo, 1988., [The Committee on 
Social Policy, The Outline of the Committee on Social Policy, 1929, pp.20-29, collected by 
Nishinarita,Y., and Mori,T., Materials of the Committee on Social Policy, Vol.1, Tokyo, 1988, 
pp.9-11.]
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works used a large amount of domestic raw material, thereby sustaining employment in 
other sectors, the proportion of the wages of the unemployed attached to the projects 
was allowed to fall below the previously prescribed limit of 20%. Although in principle 
this permitted the employment of fewer workers who might otherwise be unemployed it 
was hoped that private companies might be encouraged to expand their supplementary 
activities once public works were seen to be encouraging improvements in the 
infrastructure. ＊29 
 Earlier the government had come under pressure from its own Committee for the 
Prevention of Unemployment which called in March 1930 for a considerable expansion 
in public works activity and for greater proportion of subsidies to be earmarked in 
the budget for such a purpose. The private sector, the Committee argued, should 
also be urged to engage in greater construction work, land development, water way 
development and forestry activity, especially in areas where unemployment had 
noticeably increased in the recent past. ＊30
 Their urging was not without effect. With no marked improvement in the 
employment situation in 1931 the government itself launched a programme of national 
road repairs, raising a road loan of 22 million yen. In addition 20 million yen was set 
aside for improvements in the railway system and 70 million yen for employment-
creating improvements in agriculture, forestry and fishery. Unemployment relief 
expenditure was now to be directed to the needs not only of casual workers but also 
skilled and intellectual (white collar) workers. All relief works furthermore were to be 
advanced to earlier dates than might otherwise have been provided for. ＊31 
 The extension of and relaxation in the conditions attached to public works took 
place against a continuing concern for budgetary stability. S. Yoshida, Head of the Social 
Bureau, had complained in 1929 that budgetary retrenchments had unfairly impacted 
upon the unemployed.＊32 The Minister of Commerce and Industry agreed but other MPs 
argued that the government’s principal responsibility should be to reduce expenditure, 
cut taxes, and thereby facilitate the recovery of private industry upon which future 
 
＊29  Rodosho, op.cit., p.577. [Ministry of Labour, op.cit., p.577.]
＊30  Rodosho, Ibid., p.380. [Ministry of Labour, Ibid., p.380.]
＊31  Rodosho, Ibid., p.580. [Ministry of Labour, Ibid., p.580.]
＊32  Shakai Seisaku Shingikai, Dai 1 Kai Shakai Seisaku Shingikai Sokai Gijiroku, 9 August 
1929, collected in Nishinarita et al., op.cit., Vol.1, p.40. [The Committee on Social Policy, 
Report of the First General Meeting, 9 August 1929, collected in Nishinarita et.al., op.cit., 
Vol.1, p.40.]
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employment ultimately depended. ＊33 As one MP, J. Soeda, argued there should be no 
presumption that budgetary retrenchment would necessarily lead to deterioration in 
unemployment if such retrenchment spurred the private sector to provide jobs likely to 
last without imposing further and dangerous rises in public expenditure. ＊34 
 None of this posturing came anywhere near to a detailed or systematic discussion of 
how the budget might actively be used to relieve unemployment. ＊35 It is clear from the 
Committee on Social Policy’s ‘Enquiries on the Unemployment Relief Systems and the 
Depressed Conditions of the Recent Economy’ in 1929 that government oﬃcials held 
very diﬀering views as to whether or not a tight budget pursued alongside a positive 
policy of industrial rationalization would or would not worsen the unemployment 
situation. The cleavage with basically between those who saw budgetary stability and 
the promotion of greater efficiency in industry as the basis of affordable and stable 
economic progress and those who were concerned about their immediate impact upon 
unemployment and upon social unrest. Those who held the latter view were not opposed 
either to a sound budget or to improvement on the structure of industry but worried 
about time scale of any likely beneﬁt to employment. In their view it was an abrogation 
of government responsibility to rely on medium and even long term measures of 
industrial improvement when faced with deterioration in unemployment. Moreover, the 
experience of those foreign countries which had undertaken programmes of industrial 
rationalization pointed to an immediate shake out of labour as a consequence. ＊36 K. 
Adachi, Minister of the Home Oﬃce and President of the Committee, tried to strike a 
compromise between these opposing views in the Committee’s Final Report:
 The present government are putting an emphasis on the rationalization of industry and in 
doing so have tried to develop the industries of our country. In the discussions of this Committee, 
 
＊33  Shakai Seisaku Shingikai, Dai 3 Kai Shimon Dai 1 Go Tokubetsu Iinkai Gijiroku, 24 Au-
gust 1929, compiled in Nishinarita et al., op.cit., Vol. 2, 1988, p.43. [The Committee on So-
cial Policy, Report of the Third Special Meeting on No.1 Consultation, 9 August 1929, col-
lected in Nishinarita et.al., op.cit., Vol.2, 1988, p.43.]
＊34  Ibid.,pp.41-42.
＊35  Shakai Seisaku Shingikai, Dai 5 Kai Shimon Dai 1 Go Tokubetsu Iinkai Gijiroku, 4 Sep-
tember 1929, collected in Ibid., p.50. [The Committee on Social Policy, Report of the Fifth 
Special Meeting on No.1 Consultation, 4 September 1929, collected in Ibid., p.50.]
＊36  Shakai Seisaku Shingikai, Dai 16 Kai Shimon Dai 1 Go Tokubetsu Iinkai  Gijiroku, 9 De-
cember 1929, collected in Ibid., pp.128-130. [The Committee on the Social Policy, Report of 
the Sixteenth Special Meeting on No.1 Consultation, collected in Ibid., pp.128-130.]
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there has been no objection to the view that rationalization of industry is one of the most inﬂuential 
means of helping industry develop, and as a result its positive means of preventing unemployment.
 However, judging from the experience of foreign countries rationalization does have a 
tendency to force temporary unemployment. The government therefore needs to ameliorate 
such unemployment as far as possible. ＊37
 But the Home Office faced sterner position from the Minister of Finance. Any 
increase in direct government expenditure for unemployment relief work, argued the 
Minister Inoue, could only proceed on a case-by-case basis if budgetary retrenchment 
was to be preserved. ＊38 Opponents argued that such unemployment relief works 
could properly be regarded as an exception to retrenchment policy in the prevailing 
circumstances. ＊39 As such, Adachi argued, the central government should be urged to 
undertake new public works ‘when it is considered to be necessary and urgent’. ＊40 The 
Ministry of Finance, however, countered that to date the central government had never 
directly undertaken relief works on behalf of the unemployed or had ever agreed to 
amend its budget for such purposes, direct action having previously provided only for 
discretionary loans to local authorities. ＊41
 In Japan, the Hamaguchi cabinet, needing to respond to worsening unemployment 
during the great depression, was faced with the prospect of encouraging direct 
government activity, with its accompanying ﬁnancial obligations, to an extent that had 
not be seen before and which key officials felt was fundamentally irresponsible. The 
cleavage of opinion began to soften, however, when relief works came to be seen less 
as a means of allaying social unrest in particular cities, with all the attendant fears of 
allowing speciﬁc action to set awkward administrative and ﬁnancial precedents, than as 
 
＊37  Shakai Seisaku Shingikai, Dai 5 Kai Sokai Giji Sokkiroku, 21 September 1929, collected in 
Nishinarita et.al., op.cit., Vol.1, 1988, pp.201-202. [The Committee on Social Policy, Report of 
the Fifth General Meeting, 21 September 1929, collected in Nishinarita et.al., op.cit., Vol.1., 
1988, pp.201-202.]
＊38  Shakai Seisaku Shingikai, Dai 2 Kai Shakai Seisaku Shingikai Soukai Gijiroku, 12 Septem-
ber 1929, collected in Ibid., p.62. [The Committee on Social Policy, Report of the Second 
General Meeting, collected in Ibid., p.62.]
＊39 Ibid. pp.69-70.
＊40  Shakai Seisaku Shingikai, Dai 2 Kai Sokai Giji Sokkiroku,12 September 1929, collected in 
Nishinarita et.al., op.cit., Vol.1, 1988, p.73. [The Committee on the Social Policy, Report of 
the Second General Meeting, collected in Nishinarita et.al., op.cit., Vol.1, 1988, p.73.]
＊41 Ibid.,p.73.
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a direct and necessary response to a more widespread decline in economic fortunes. As J. 
Kawanishi, Head of Employment in the Social Bureau of the Home Oﬃce explained in a 
reﬂective view of his term of oﬃce:
 I was the Head of Section of Employment from October 1926 to June 1932. For most of the 
time the government limited the extent of its remedial policies to the six largest cities and then 
only in winter time…following a principle of a tight budget…I thought that the eﬀects were very 
limited as a consequence…We tried to abolish limits on the extent and timing of such works and 
to encourage activity across the whole country…We were unable to win the ﬁght even though 
we tried to get the unemployment problem discussed systematically among all the ministries 
including the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Transport, and the military authorities. ＊42
 
 Eﬀorts to encourage a more expansive policy on the part of the government were not 
limited to particular oﬃcials. Y. Muto, then President of Kanegafuchi Boseki Company 
(Kanegafuchi Spinning Company) argued in late September 1929 that:
 The unemployment problem nowadays is not inevitable. Most of it arises from the waste of 
capital. Judging from the experiences of our country, we can understand that waste of capital 
in times of war, such as during the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, but misuse 
of capital through investing unproductively and hoarding capital becomes a cause of depression 
and bears upon unemployment. Such conduct is the enemy of society. We cannot solve the 
unemployment problem without conquering an enemy of this kind. ＊43
He wrote further:
 When we consider both the government’s behaviour and that of the private sector in Japan 
 
＊42  J. Kawanishi no Kaiso, in ‘Senzen no Rodo Gyosei wo Kataru - Zadan Kai - ’, Rodo 
Gyosei Shi Dai 1 Kan Yoroku, 1961, p.23. [Recollection of J. Kawanishi, the Record of the 
Symposium, compiled in Ministry of Labour, The History of Labour Administration, Sup-
plement of Vol.1, p.23, 1961.]
＊43  Muto, Y.,‘Shitsugyo Mondai no Konponteki Kaiketsu’, Shakai Seisaku Jiho, No.108, Shit-
sugyo Mondai Tokushu Go, September, 1929, p.12. [Muto, Y.,‘The Fundamental Solution of 
the Unemployment Problem’, Social Reform, No. 108, Special Edition on Unemployment 
Problems, September 1929, p.12.]
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with regard to unemployment, it is the government’s waste of capital that is more problematic. 
The most important thing to do is to solve the political resistance to using capital more 
productively. ＊44
 Part of the problem, according to K. Takahashi, a leading journalist on the Oriental 
Economist at the time, was that government oﬃcials had failed to recognize the extent 
to which Japanese unemployment was reﬂecting not a temporary disease of capitalism 
so much as a breakdown in the normal relationship between industrial and agricultural 
depression. In agricultural areas it was not unusual for workers to be unemployed and 
re-employed on a regular basis. It had become customary, therefore, to presume that 
governments need not rush policy making since the agricultural areas could always 
act as a shock-absorber, allowing the unemployed in city areas to drift back into rural 
centres where half work and half unemployment was accepted as a norm.＊45
 The prevailing diﬃculty, however, was that economic deterioration in the agricultural 
sector was having the reverse eﬀect in encouraging agricultural workers to drift into 
cities to seek sometimes non-existent employment. As a consequence the problem of 
unemployment was now extending beyond casual workers to the white collar sectors. 
This not only threatened a loss of productive eﬀort but also the possibility of increased 
social unrest. ＊46
 We have noted already how regulations were in force down to 1928 to limit the 
proportion of the total outlay on relief expenditures payable to wages to 20% in order 
to oﬀer some relief to the unemployed without the projects becoming too generous and 
how wages for skilled workers thought necessary to complete such works could form a 
higher proportion of total outlays up to 30%.＊47
 This emphasis upon supporting public works for the unemployed but with an eye 
to efficiency and limited outlay resulted in part from complaints by local authorities 
 
＊44 Ibid.,p.13.
＊45  Takahashi, K.,‘Waga Kuni Genzai no Shitsugyo Mondai no Seishiutsu to Sono Juten’, 
Shakai Seisaku Jiho, No.108, Shitsugyo Mondai Tokusyu Go, September 1929, p.62. [Taka-
hashi, K.,‘The Present Condition of Unemployment in Japan’, Social Reform, No. 108, Spe-
cial Edition on Unemployment Problems, September 1929, p. 62.]
＊46  Kawazu, S.,‘Chishiki Kaikyu no Shitsugyo Mondai ni Tsuite’, Shakai Seisaku Jiho, No. 108, 
Shitsugyo Mondai Tokushu Go, September 1929, p. 17. [Kawazu, S.,‘On the Unemployment 
of Intellectual Workers in Japan’, Social Reform, No. 108, Special Edition on Unemploy-
ment Problems, September 1929, p.17.]
＊47  Rodosho, op.cit., p.570. [Ministry of Labour, op.cit., p.570.]
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managing such projects. H. Seki, then the Mayor of Osaka city reﬂected in 1932 that:
 The unemployment relief works which have taken place since 1925 in our country were not 
economically eﬀective. Until 1928 many of them employed a majority of unskilled workers. Year 
by year the need to continue such relief works became obvious but the real value of some of the 
programmes was ignored. The total amount of issued loans to the large cities and prefectures 
nonetheless reached 10 million yen because of a continuing need to oﬀer work at relatively lower 
wages to unskilled workers. Although these loans were raised at low interest rates the interest 
burden on many cities budgets could last for 10 years or more. ＊48
 Such considerations lay behind the government’s decision to ensure that any 
expansion of unemployment relief work provision in the midst of the world slump 
should carry particular restrictions. By January 1932 regulations were in place to 
exclude persons considered officially to be poor and lacking any ability to work. An 
unemployment certificate scheme was introduced in 1929 and efforts to equalize the 
opportunity for work to as many diﬀerent types of unemployed workers as possible. 
 The decision in 1931 to have the government intervene more directly in the provision 
of unemployment relief work was the result of a combination of concerns at the time 
including debates about increased government outlay versus continued budgetary 
retrenchment, about the need to expand the statistical basis upon which policies and 
their financial implications might be based, and about ensuring that the number and 
type of workers attracted to such public works should be kept under strict review for 
the sake of efficiency. Having once embarked in 1931 on a more dedicated if limited 
programme of public works for road and rail improvement and the expansion of 
farmland ﬁnance by public loans at low interest rates, a signiﬁcant shift had none the 
less been made away from an overriding principle of a tight budgetary policy. Although 
Finance Minister Inoue had long argued for government intervention on unemployment 
relief works to be an exceptional case, the budget deficit for 1932 financial year 
amounted to 130 million yen, with 19 million yen directly earmarked for public works 
expenditure on behalf of the unemployed. ＊49
 
＊48  Seki, H., ‘Shitsugyo Kyusai Jigyo’, Shakai Seisaku Jiho, No. 146, Shakai Seisaku no Saikento 
Tokushu, November 1932, p.51. [Seki, H., ‘ The Relief of Unemployment ’, Social Reform, 
No. 146, Special Edition on the Re-examination of Social Policy, November 1932, p.51.]
＊49  Hashimoto,J., ‘Keizai Seisaku’, Oishi, K., ed., Nihon Teikoku Shugi Shi, Vol.2, Sekai Daiky-
oko Ki, Tokyo, 1987,p.101. [ Hashimoto, J., ‘Economic Policy’, Ohishi, K., ed.,, The History 
of Japanese Imperialism, Vol. 2, The Period of World Depression, 1987, p.101.]
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(3) Unemployment relief works after the abandonment of the gold standard
 As we had seen above, Japan was fettered to the notion of ‘Economic Normalcy’ 
and therefore, they believed that returning to the gold standard was the best policy for 
economic stability. However, after the Great Depression from 1929, the international 
economic context which they had relied upon changed completely. In September 
1931, Britain finally abandoned the gold standard and many industrialized countries 
followed Britain’s decision. Japan also followed Britain in abandoning the gold standard 
in December 1931 after vain struggle to remain to the gold standard system, likewise 
gaining greater ﬂexibility in its budgetary stance. The Seiyu-party which took over the 
Minsei-party after the abandonment of the gold standard, took a more positive view 
of the active use of the budget not least in the ﬁeld of unemployment policy. As the 
International Labour Oﬃce reported in 1935:
 In Japan, at a special session of the Diet in June 1932, it was decided (1) to authorise an 
expansion of the ﬁduciary issue from 120 million yen to 1,000 million yen; (2) to provide a large 
amount of money for Government assistance to agriculture, fisheries and small trades, for 
assistance to certain local authorities, and for public works; and (3) to authorise the Minister of 
Finance to control all transactions in foreign currencies. The large public expenditure, which 
included the sums required for the campaign in Shanghai and Manchuria, raised the total 
budget to 1,940 million yen, the highest ﬁgure ever reached in Japan. No increased taxation was 
imposed, the deﬁcit of 705 million yen being ﬁnanced by loan. Of this loan expenditure, about 300 
million yen was used for the operations in Shanghai and Manchuria and the remainder for public 
works and other purposes designed to stimulate economic recovery. The budget for 1933-1934 
was even larger than that of the preceding year and amounted to 2,309 million yen. This sum 
includes 209 million yen for improvement of military equipment, 190 million yen for expenditure 
in Manchuria, and 223 million yen for the relief of the unemployed and assistance to agriculture. 
The deﬁcit of 900 million yen was ﬁnanced by loan. ＊50
 But this did not mean increasing expenditure along conventional lines. From 1932 
a much clearer distinction was made between expenditure for the direct relief of 
unemployment and that for infrastructure development. This distinction had not been 
entirely absent in the past but it now took on a clearer form. Following a change 
 
＊50  International Labour Oﬃce, op.cit., 1935, p.88.
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of government in 1932 budgetary expenditure on unemployment relief works was 
divided into the two categories. Whereas 3.69 million yen was allocated to temporary 
Unemployment Relief Works as customarily understood, some 32 million yen was allocated 
to ‘Public Works for Industrial Development’designed in part to aid unemployment but 
principally for the purpose of broader economic development. ＊51 Moreover, the category 
‘Unemployment Relief Works’was formally renamed ‘Unemployment Temporary 
Works’ not for the sake of semantics but to indicate a ﬁrmer shift of in policy＊52 denying 
the unemployed any notion of a ‘right’ to relief; public works were to be essentially 
temporary not permanent. ＊53
 Shifts in budgetary policy reflected this stance with a noticeable reduction in the 
allocation of funds for unemployment relief works strictly deﬁned in favour of greater 
expenditure on infrastructure development designed to improve manufacturing and 
other activity in a more general sense. Moreover, following the 5.15 Incident in which 
Prime Minister T. Inukai was assassinated by army oﬃcers demanding greater relief to 
agricultural areas, what relief policy was to be made available was concentrated in such 
areas where the greater pool of surplus labour was believed to exist.
 The distinction made between Temporary Unemployment Relief Works and Public 
Works for Industrial Development makes it difficult to assess precisely the effects of 
public works activity on the unemployed since many of the out of work beneﬁted by 
default from the development of public works expenditure not speciﬁcally designed for 
them. The existing historiography is revealing in this respect. Mochida, for example, 
claims that public works expenditure on the unemployed conventionally deﬁned (relating 
particularly to roads, rivers and ports) had very positive eﬀects between 1929 and 1935, 
not least in expanding employment opportunities for casual workers. ＊54 Nakamura, 
reviewing relief-related local government expenditures during the 1930s, notes an 
increased proportion of expenditure in prefectures and villages on public works both 
for the purposes of direct relief and for wider industrial promotion which, even ignoring 
possible multiplier eﬀects, was likely to have signiﬁcantly improved prospects in farm 
 
＊51  Kase, op.cit., p.272.
＊52  Ministry of Labour, op.cit., p.583.
＊53  Ibid., p. 583.
＊54  Mochida, N.,‘Toshi no Seibi to Kaihatsu’, in Nishikawa, S., and Yamamoto, Y., eds., Sangy-
oka no Jidai (Ge), Nihon Keizai Shi 5, Tokyo, 1990, pp. 314-315.  [Mochida, N.,‘The Fulﬁl-
ment and Development of the Cities’, in Nishikawa, S., and Yamamoto, Y., eds., The Age 
of Industrialisation, Economic History of Japan Vol. 5, Tokyo, 1990, pp. 314-315.]
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villages. ＊55 Kase, on the other hand, argues that such optimism is misplaced since many 
public works initiated in agricultural areas came from the private sector and not from 
the government and even then actual expenditure often fell short of planned expenditure 
because private entrepreneurs were frequently reluctant to persist in such activity 
given the uncertainties over likely proﬁt returns. ＊56
 Contemporary observers were also sceptical about the scale and effectiveness of 
the public works implemented specifically for the unemployed after 1932. Kazahaya, 
writing in 1937, saw such responses as woefully inadequate and so lacking in proﬁtability 
that they were unlikely ever to attract the support of the private sector. ＊57 Seki, 
Mayor of Osaka ,argued as early as 1932 that such public relief works tended to be 
so uneconomical and limited in scope that they frequently intensified unemployment 
by attracting to mainland Japan Korean workers who had few prospects of gaining 
permanent employment even in better times, a point to which we have already drawn 
attention. Moreover, the kinds of works implemented were often singularly inappropriate 
for those groups of workers recently thrown out of work during the world slump, 
thereby increasing the duration of their unemployment. ＊58
 A review of Japanese public works by the International Labour Oﬃce added fuel to 
contemporary criticism of their intrinsic value. Writing in 1931 the ILO noted:
 It is important to draw a distinction between public works and mere relief works. It is 
sometimes said that all undertakings put in hand by public authorities for the express purpose 
of creating employment are relief works; but that would rule out a large number of undoubtedly 
useful public works which are undertaken during a period of unemployment because that is the 
most convenient time from the ﬁnancial and social points of view. The real distinction between 
the two depends on the way in which the works are carried out. During the nineteenth century 
a number of schemes of so-called relief works were undertaken at diﬀerent times with varying 
success. One of the most successful of these schemes was that adopted in Great Britain in 1863 
at the time of the cotton famine consequent on the American Civil War. It was a comparatively 
small scheme, for during the three years of its existence never more than 8,000 workers were 
 
＊55  Nakamura., T., Economic Growth in Pre-war Japan, New Haven and London, 1971, 
pp.236-237.
＊56  Kase, op. cit., pp. 19-20.
＊57  Kazahaya, Y., Nihon Shakai Seisaku Shi, Tokyo, 1937, pp.313-316. [Kazahaya, Y., The His-
tory of Japanese Social Policy, Tokyo, 1937, pp.313-316.]
＊58  Seki, op.cit., pp. 20-58. 
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provided with employment at wages, but it owed its success mainly to the fact that the work 
was done on ordinary commercial principles. This meant that the men were chosen not because 
they were unemployed but because they were ﬁt for the job, and in many cases were specially 
trained for it; they were paid the customary wages; and they were reasonably eﬃcient because 
otherwise they would have been discharged. It often happens that these conditions are not 
compiled with, and then we have pure relief works which are quite diﬀerent from normal public 
works. ＊59
The report continued:
 Thus we ﬁnd that men are chosen for the work not because they are ﬁtted for the job but 
because they happen to be unemployed at the moment, and it is especially bad that skilled 
workmen should be put on to unskilled work with the risk that they may lose their skill unless 
employment in their own trade comes along fairly quickly… Another feature of many relief 
works is the institution of a relay system. Men are engaged for a short time and are then 
turned oﬀ, irrespective of their eﬃciency, in favour of other men, so as to give as many of the 
unemployed as possible a chance of employment…The result of the system is that the men have 
no interest in the work they are doing except to make the job last as long as they can so that 
when their turn comes round again there may still be work for them to do. ＊60
 The essential difficulty with the optimistic and pessimistic assessments of 
unemployment relief works after 1932 is that they focus too much on the temporary 
works as strictly defined by the Home Office and the Ministry of Finance. The 
pessimists are right in claiming that such relief works were a limited and inadequate 
response to unemployment but relief works policy after May 1932 has to be viewed in a 
much broader perspective.
 Expenditure on relief works earmarked for the unemployed declined year by year 
from 1931 because thereafter activities such as road, river and port works development 
were no longer regarded as part of a programme of temporary relief for the unemployed 
but rather as important elements in a broader scheme of industrial development. 
The official view was that the unemployed would benefit from such activities since 
 
＊59 International Labour Oﬃce, op.cit., 1931, p.107.
＊60 Ibid., p.108.
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infrastructure development would so improve the broader base of industrial activity 
that the out of work would ﬁnd increasing opportunities for employment. ＊61 It was in 
this vein that unemployment relief works costing fewer than 300,000 yen were to be 
cancelled from September 1932＊62 in favour of the unemployed being assisted by broader 
developments in the private sector.
 In order to encourage the unemployed take advantage of general infrastructure 
development through the expanded public works programme, and fearful that some 
unemployed might already have lost the will to work as a consequence of being 
involved in previously limited relief work activity, the government launched a training 
programme for the registered unemployment in 1935. As the Ministry of Labour put it:
 It is not desirable that the unemployed should remain on Temporary Unemployment Relief 
Works because under such conditions workers are going to lose their capacity to rebuild their 
lives. They need to be trained physically and mentally to allow them to obtain employment in 
the private sector. ＊63
 
＊61 Rodosho, op.cit., p.583. [Ministry of Labour, op.cit., p.583.]
＊62 Ibid., p.584.
＊63 Ibid., p.584. 
Table 3   Comparison of wages of day labourers and workers employed on 
Unemployment Relief Works, 1925-1931.
Year
Average Daily 
Wage of Day 
Labourers
Average Daily Wage of
Workers on Unemployment 
Relief Works Year
Average Daily 
Wage of Day 
Labourers
Average Daily Wage of
Workers on Unemployment 
Relief Works
(yen) Budget (yen) Result (yen) (yen) Budget (yen) Result (yen)
1925 2.13 1.69 1.85 1932 1.30 1.64 1.50
1926 2.05 1.59 1.90 1933 1.28 1.44 1.37
1927 1.98 1.68 1.93 1934 1.30 1.37 1.33
1928 1.98 1.71 1.87 1935 1.33 1.37 1.34
1929 1.93 1.86 1.82 1936 1.33 1.39 1.43
1930 1.63 1.75 1.77 1937 1.43 1.44 1.49
1931 1.40 1.42 1.18 1938 1.58 1.40 1.63
The Department of Finance, Financial and Economic Annual of Japan, Tokyo, 1914-1939.
For the year of 1938, the figures 122.1 and 118.2 were calculated indices based on the 
average of April 1934-March 1935 (=100). Wages of workers on unemployment relief works, 
Kase, K.,Senzen Nihon no Shitsugyo Taisaku - Kyusaigata Kokyojigyo no Ichi Kenkyu - , 
Tokyo, 1998, p.17. [Kase, K.,Unemployment Policy in Pre-war Japan - A Study of Relief Type 
Public Works-, Tokyo, 1998, p.17.]
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 In addition, the unemployed who might subsequently be involved in the broader 
schemes of industrial development were expected to gain more materially, given that 
wages for the unemployed working on unemployment relief works strictly deﬁned had 
been lower that the average day labourers wage before 1931. The gap narrowed over 
time and ﬁnally from 1930, the average daily wage of workers on Unemployment Relief 
Works became higher than the one of day labourers as the following table shows: 
 This shows that the characteristics of Unemployment Relief Works in Japan changed 
from 1930 from the subsidy for the unemployed to the expenditure of market-based 
public works which aimed to build infrastructure.
(4) Unemployment relief works after 1935
 The recovery of the economy after 1932 and the establishment of formal training 
facilities for the unemployed to fit them for work on schemes of national industrial 
development after 1935 put public works activity into a very diﬀerent perspective to 
that of the late 1920s and early 1930s. Planned expenditure on public works in 1937 for 
example, was only one-tenth of that planned in the peak year of 1931. Public relief works 
for the unemployed were not ruled out entirely but as a Social Bureau explained in 1937:
 As the economy recovers year by year the unemployed in the normal working age groups 
and particularly the young unemployed are gradually ﬁnding work especially in the cities. Those 
who remain a concern to the administration are those who are older, who had lost their desire to 
work or who had far less ability than normal workers. ＊65
 But oﬃcial attention turned away increasing away from public works per se towards 
training programmes for those still out of work in order to enable their speedier return 
to productive work.
3  Unemployment Relief Works in Interwar Britain
(1) The emergence of unemployment relief works in Britain
 The unemployment relief works in Britain has a long history. At the end of the 
 
＊64 Kase, op.cit., p.17.
＊65  Shakai Kyoku, Shitsugyo Okyu Jigyo Gaiyo, 1937, p.15. [Social Bureau, The General Outline 
of Temporary Unemployment Relief Works, 1937, p.15.]
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19 th century, Britain faced the Great Depression and the unemployment problems 
became the one of the main social problems. At that time, the distinction between the 
unemployment problems and the problems of poverty was not clear. Both problems 
were treated in the system of the Poor Law. But the Great Depression became 
the turning point on this issue. J. Chamberlain, then the Head of Local Government 
Board issued the famous Chamberlain Circular in 1886 and instructed the main local 
governments to do the unemployment relief works as a response to the unemployment 
problems of the able-bodied workers. The aim of the circular by Chamberlain was to 
establish the new relief system outside the Poor Law, but in fact, it just strengthened 
the Poor Law system. As British Economy recovered towards the end of 19 th century, 
the unemployment problems became less important in the country. When the Boer 
War ended in 1902, Britain again faced the problems. Britain enacted the Unemployed 
Workmen Act in 1905 and the unemployment relief works were considered as a main 
local governments’ response. Unemployment problems also became the social problems 
that should be treated not by the volunteer organization but by the local authorities. 
Although the effect of this Act was said to be limited, this was the important step 
to establish more comprehensive unemployment policy in Britain. People began to 
think that the provider of relief system for the able-bodied unemployed should be a 
central government and the German unemployment insurance system was referred 
by the politicians and the intellectuals. As a result, in 1911, Unemployment Insurance 
Act enacted as a Part II of the National Insurance Act. The government now became 
the main provider of the unemployment policy and unemployment insurance became 
the main policy for the unemployed. The role of the Poor Law became less and less 
important. The unemployment relief works were also considered supplementary policy 
at the time of the cyclical depression. ＊66
  Garside illustrates the payments to the unemployed under the unemployment 
insurance scheme and the payments under the Poor Law in the interwar years as 
follows. This clearly shows that the main unemployment policy was the unemployment 
insurance scheme in interwar Britain.
 
＊66  The representative research on unemployment policy including unemployment re-
lief works is, Harris., J., Unemployment and Politics, A Study in English Social Policy, 
1886-1914, London, 1972. 
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Table 4  Unemployment Relief Payments,1921-1938
　
Insurance Scheme Supplementary Scheme





Expenditure £( ｍ ) Number of 
Authorized 
Claims
Expenditure £( ｍ ) Number 




£( ｍ )Year Beneﬁts Administration Total Beneﬁts Administration Total
1921 － 34.1 1.1 35.4 － 　 　 － －
1922 954,000 52.9 4.8 59.8 253,000 　 　 239,000 －
1923 800,000 41.9 4.5 51.6 261,000 　 　 174,000 12.1
1924 544,000 36.0 4 .0 50.4 491,000 　 　 113,000 8.4
1925 － 44.6 4.6 54.4 － 　 　 162,000 5.4
1926 － 43.7 4.9 51.4 － 　 　 264,000 7.0
1927 － 38.7 3.5 42.9 － 　 　 154,000 13.7
1928 973,000 36.5 4.9 46.6 119,000 　 　 112,000 8.1
1929 － 46.8 5.1 54.4 － 　 　 94,000 5.9
1930 1,973,000 42.3 5.2 54.2 383,000 3.7 0.3 4.0 59,000 4.8
1931 1,345,000 73.0 5.3 81.0 762,000 19.2 1.0 20.2 101,000 2.6
1932 1,200,000 80.2 5.4 90.5 1,039,000 30.7 1.6 32.3 168,000 4.0
1933 854,000 54.2 4.2 64.0 936,000 50.4 3.4 53.8 192,000 6.5
1934 952,000 40.2 3.8 57.7 728,000 48.4 3.7 52.1 222,000 8.1
1935 822,000 43.8 4.1 54.1 688,000 42.2 4.0 46.2 173,000 9.7
1936 744,000 42.7 4.6 52.7 579,000 42.4 4.3 46.7 144,000 9.6
1937 896,000 35.3 4.9 45.8 556,000 37.4 4.4 41.8 30,000 7.8
1938 1,076,000 36.7 5.1 67.3 554,000 36.7 4.7 41.4 28,000 2.5
Extracted from Garside, W.R., British Unemployment 1919-1939 - A Study in Public Policy -,
Cambridge University Press, 1990,pp.84-85.
(2) The unemployment relief works after the World War I
 But after the World War I, the discussion again occurred on the‘supplementary’ 
unemployment relief works. From the beginning of post-war recession, the government 
removed the war-time restrictions on local government borrowing for public works. 
But it was clear that the local government could not meet the emergency situation on 
unemployment without the central government’s ﬁnancial assistance. The government 
agreed to subsidize the annual charge on unemployment relief works undertaken by 
local authorities out of capital expenditure and to pay part of the wages bill for approved 
schemes of public works in 1920. In December 1920, the Unemployment Grants 
Committee (UGC) was established and became in charge of ﬁnancial aid according to 
the following principles. (1) Expenditure was not exceed a total of £3,000,000, (2) works 
would be approved only in areas where the existence of serious unemployment which 
was not otherwise provided for was certiﬁed by the Ministry of Labour, (3) Preference 
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had to be given in employment to employed ex-servicemen, (4) the grant should not 
exceed 30 % of the wages bill of additional men employed, (5) the works should be 
‘of public utility’. The assistance was provided mainly to sewerage, salvage disposal, 
the supply of electricity, the extension of improvement of docks and harbours, and 
the construction, diversion and reconstruction of those unclassiﬁed roads ineligible for 
ﬁnancial aid from the Road Fund. ＊67
 As we have already noted above, by the late-nineteenth century, the most general 
method of relieving the unemployment outside the Poor Law was considered to be 
emergency relief works by local authorities. Towards the end of the Edwardian period, 
the idea of manipulating existing plans for capital expenditure for the unemployed took 
root. The famous Minority Report proposed that the central government should took a 
role to subsidize a deﬁnite proportion of its normal capital expenditure for public works 
on a commercial basis. Intellectuals such as A. L. Bowley, A. C. Pigou, W. H. Beveridge 
or D. H. Robertson expressed their support for the idea of counter-cyclical public works 
for the unemployed. TUC and Labour Party also tried to take action along this line. The 
idea of advance planning of public works as a means of stabilizing employment situation 
gradually expanded its inﬂuence in the intellectual and administrative ﬁelds by 1920 and 
UGC was ﬁnally established in the year. ＊68
 Original intention of the grant scheme was to provide temporary relief works in 
localities in the winter period in 1920. But the worsening unemployment situation made 
the renewal of unemployment relief works for successive winters inevitable. The UGC 
encouraged the local authorities to take positive actions to the subsidies. For that purpose, 
the grant in support of wages, which was set at 30% originally in 1920, expanded to 75% 
by August 1924. The condition on the issues of a Ministry of Labour certiﬁcate conﬁrming 
the existing of serious unemployment was also dropped in March 1924.＊69
 The transition of unemployment relief works in the 1920s shows the changing 
characteristics of the unemployment relief works in Britain. The proportion of wage bill 
in grant was originally at low and as time went by, it doubled in a few years time. This 
fact shows that the unemployment relief works could not attract the local authorities 
in Britain. The central government therefore, had to make the original strict conditions 
relax over the years. 
 
＊67  Garside, op.cit., pp.302-303.
＊68  Garside, op.cit., pp.299-302.
＊69  Garside, op.cit., p.303.
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 It is said that the chief beneﬁciaries of many unemployment relief works schemes 
was the lower classes of labour who had fallen on the Poor Law rather than those 
who best fitted for the job in hand. Actually, by the mid-1920s, there was a growing 
disenchantment with unemployment public works in Britain. From December 1925, 
grants became restricted to the schemes undertaken by local authorities. In the period 
between December 1920 and March 1922, the number of scheme approved by UGC was 
3,523 and it decreased to 2,272 in the period between July 1924 and June 1925. However, 
it decreased by half to 1,240 in the period between July 1925 and June 1926 and 
dramatically dropped to 63 in the period between July 1926 and June 1927, became 28 in 
the period between July 1927 and June 1928. The average number of persons employed 
directly on approved unemployment relief works by UGC fell around 57,000 between 
1921 and mid-1926 to an average of less than 7,000 during the following two years. ＊70
(3) The unemployment relief works after the Great Depression
 The deepening world depression after 1929 affected most Western industrialized 
countries. In Britain, local authorities, trade unionists, and representatives of the 
Labour Party began to persuade the Cabinet to adopt a more positive attitude to the 
unemployment relief works from the end of 1920s. ＊71 However, the central government 
still refused to undertake unemployment relief works directly and remained waited local 
authorities to make use of the subsidies designed for them. But as the unemployment rates 
increased sharply from 17.7% in 1930 to 23.6% in 1931, the central government in Britain 
was forced to renew its appeal to local authorities to take more vigorous actions, especially 
in submitting schemes which could be started in advance of the winter time. But by this 
time, the grant-aided unemployment public works became to make little impression on 
overall unemployment and the work by the UGC was critically reviewed.＊72  The collapse 
of the second Labour government brought the work of the UGC to an end in 1932. ＊73
 The same kind of argument between the Ministry of Home Oﬃce and the Ministry 
of Finance in Japan can also be found in Britain. Oswald Mosley strongly argued in 
1929 that a far more rigorous programme of national road development policy for the 
unemployed. To Mosley, substantial road development schemes were critical to the 
prestige of the central government because they oﬀered the works rapidly to the large 
 
＊70  Ibid., p.306.
＊71  Garside, op.cit., p.306.
＊72  Ibid., p.308.
＊73  Ibid., p.309.
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number of the unemployed. But the Treasury opposed to increase road expenditure 
because they feared the systematic increase in national spending. ＊74 Treasury’s basic 
opposition to the state-sponsored public works was that they would be unproductive and 
argued that borrowing of such works without due regard to proﬁtability would simply 
reduce the supply of capital available to ﬁnance private sector. This view was based on 
the ﬁrm economic orthodoxy and was called as the ‘Treasury View’, which ruled the 
ﬁnancial stance in the interwar Britain. ＊75
 From 1927, The Minister of Labour began to judge that the unemployment relief 
works by UGC as a wasteful use of capital and therefore a mistake. ＊76
 Garside reviewed S. Howson’s interesting but highly speculative estimates of the 
maximum potential eﬀect of the public works between 1920 and 1932 in Britain as follows. 
 
＊74  Garside,op.cit.,p.311.
＊75  Garside, W.R., ‘The Failure of the ‘Radical Alternative’: Public Works, Deﬁcit Finance 
and British Interwar Unemployment’, The Journal of European Economic History, Vol-
ume 14, Number 3, Winter 1985. 
＊76  Garside, W.R., British Unemployment 1919-1939 - A Study in Public Policy -,Cambridge 
University Press, 1990,p.306.
Table 5  Possible Employment Eﬀects of Planned Public Works in Britain,1920-1932.
Year
























Dec.1920-Mar. 1922 26.6 13.5 40.1 100,250 200,500 300,750-400,100
Mar.1922-June 1923 15.9 10.8 26.7 66,750 133,500 200,250-267,000
July 1923-June 1924 24.2 5.1 29.3 73,250 146,500 219,750-293,000
July 1924-June 1925 20.6 4.7 25.3 63,250 126,500 189,750-253,000
July 1925-June 1926 17.6 3.7 21.3 53,250 106,500 159,750-213,000
July 1926-June 1927 0.8 3.7 4.5 11,250 22,500 33,750-45,000
July 1927-June 1928 0.3 2.7 3 7,500 15,000 22,500-30,000
July 1928-June 1929 6.2 2.9 9.1 22,750 45,500 68,250-91,000
June 1929-Aug. 1930 43.5 12.9 56.4 141,000 282,000 423,000-564,000
Aug.1930-Dec.1931 35.2 51.3 86.5 216,250 432,500 648,000-865,000
Dec.1931-June 1932 0.2 2.3 2.5 62,500 125,000 187,500-250,000
Extracted from Garside, W.R., British Unemployment 1919-1939 - A Study in Public Policy -,
Cambridge University Press, 1990,p.316.
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 The table above shows that even maximum potential reduction of unemployment 
resulted from officially sponsored public works can be said to be fairly small in 
relation to recorded unemployment in interwar Britain. As the unemployment policy, 
government became more dependent to the unemployment insurance scheme. The 
Unemployment Insurance Act in 1930 liberalized the benefit scheme by the central 
government and increased the cost to the Exchequer of unemployment beneﬁts from £
20.4 million in 1929-1930 to £57.9 million in 1931-1932. ＊77 The British government had to 
wait for the reduction of unemployment rate until the British economy began to recover 
after the abandonment of gold standard in 1931. The government ﬁscal policy during the 
Great Depression remained inherently deﬂationary and the Treasury had no intention to 
relax its ﬁscal grip even when economic recovery began from 1933. ＊78
(4) The unemployment relief works after 1935
 By 1935, government’s ﬁscal stance changed little since the depression years. The 
government remained as wedded to orthodoxy and refused to countenance deliberately 
unbalanced budgets.＊79 It can be said that the government was keen to defend the ‘status 
quo’ during the years of economic recovery. 
 Unemployment related public works in Britain did not take enough role for economic 
recovery in Britain. It was rearmament which provided a stimulus to increased 
expenditure and employment for the unemployed.
 Although Keynes continuously insisted on the increase of expenditure for the public 
works, he failed to persuade the orthodox view in the government circle. The avoidance 
of a ﬁscal stimulus by the unemployment related public works throughout 1930s was a 
missed opportunity for the economy. Britain remained in the world of ‘laissez faire’ in 
the 1930s. ＊80
4  Conclusion
 Unemployment relief works which had begun at local and central level as an 
administrative response to social unrest gradually developed into a welfare policy for 
the unemployed both in Britain and Japan. Both countries’ unemployment relief works 
 
＊77  Ibid., p.345.
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seems to be alike because they followed the recommendation by the ILO. But there 
were several important diﬀerences between them as follows.
 In Britain, unemployment relief works began to relieve the able-bodied unemployed 
outside the Poor Law, but the distinction between the unemployed and the poor was not 
clear and therefore, it is said that the unemployment relief works could not be eﬀective 
enough as an ameliorative policy. But it was important to point out that people began 
to recognize that the government was responsible for the unemployment problems. 
The change of people’s notion on unemployment problems lead to the establishment of 
the unemployment insurance scheme, which became the main response to the British 
unemployment problems. But after the World War I, unemployment relief works were 
considered to be necessary for the supplemental policy in Britain. But after the mid-
1920s, it began to be considered less eﬀective for that purpose. As the time went by to 
1930s, existing compulsory unemployment insurance scheme was considered to be the 
main method for relieving the unemployed lives. 
 In Japan, the unemployment relief works remained central to the Japanese 
government’s response in the absence of any compulsory unemployment insurance 
scheme or any substantial official scheme for the poor. The main reason why the 
government preferred public works to unemployment insurance was that the latter 
tended to encourage a belief amongst the out of work that they had a right to be 
relieved, a development the authorities were determined to avoid. However, until 
the abandonment of the gold standard budgetary policy constrained the extent to 
which even this limited response could develop. Public works activity on behalf of 
the unemployed was limited to winter months and to the six largest cities and also in 
accordance with strict regulations concerning the scale of government subsidy. Once the 
gold standard was abandoned, public works expenditure and activity increased beyond 
what had been evident in 1920s but the nature of the activity also shifted unlike British 
case. But because the Japanese authorities were anxious about the deleterious eﬀects of 
temporary unemployment relief works on the skill and morale of workers, and moreover 
they did not have enough budget because of the prolonged economic depression. Japan’s GNP 
in the 1920s was just around one-seventh of that of the United States and the British 
Empire. The income level per worker was one fourth of that of the United States and 
one-third of that of the Britain. ＊81 Although many Japanese believed that Japan was 
 
＊81  Hashimoto, J., Gendai Nihon Keizaishi, Tokyo, 2000, p.21.[Hashimoto, J.,Modern Japanese 
Economic History, Tokyo, 2000, p.21. ]
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one of the ﬁve leading countries, but in fact, Japan was still a poor developing country 
comparing with Britain or the United States and did not have a room to establish the 
stable unemployment policies.
 Even after the abandonment of the gold standard system, the Japanese government 
sought to reduce the signiﬁcance of relief work activity strictly deﬁned in the mid-1930s 
and moved towards a broader policy of public works development for the improvement 
of the national infrastructure likewise in Britain. But in Britain, so-called ‘Keynesian 
Revolution’ did not happen and the compulsory unemployment insurance scheme 
remained as a main method for relieving unemployed lives which lead the budgetary 
collapse. 
 In Japan, the lack of compulsory unemployment scheme forced the central 
government put the emphasis on the unemployment public works, but as contemporary 
observers or Kase showed, the eﬀect of them should be seen as limited in comparison of 
the scale of unemployment in interwar Japan. Adding to it, the lack of any substantial 
relief schemes for the poor made the Japanese unemployment relief works take a role 
of the Poor Law. After Japan abandoned the gold standard, Japanese unemployment 
related public works became more like a normal public works, but the eﬀect of them 
were very limited and not enough to be called a ﬁscal expansion. Both countries had to 
wait for the economic recovery from the 1930s.
